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Aiming for Effective Knowledge Transfer Policies
in High- and Middle-Income Countries
suma athreye and federica rossi
11.1 Introduction
Policy interventions supporting the transfer of knowledge from public
research organizations, including universities and public research insti-
tutes, to industry, have been adopted inmany countries around the world
since the 1980s. This has led to a marked convergence in policies sup-
porting knowledge transfer from the public science base in different
countries. However, implementing similar policies in different innov-
ation systems is full of pitfalls. Drawing on the six case studies in this
book, which range from high- (United Kingdom, Germany, Republic of
Korea) to middle-income countries (China, Brazil, South Africa), we
show that, because the innovation systems in these countries were differ-
ent, the implementation of similar knowledge transfer policies was sup-
ported by different sets of complementary polices. In fact, many middle-
income countries were forced to compensate for institutional deficiencies
with supporting policies that differed from those adopted by high-
income countries.
In this chapter, we identify the different sets of complementary know-
ledge transfer policies implemented in high- and middle-income coun-
tries, evaluate their implications for the success of knowledge transfer
processes, and develop policy recommendations. Briefly, we show that in
high-income countries with mature national innovation systems, pat-
terns of interaction between university and industry already existed, and
the policy convergence merely incentivized the rearrangement of out-
comes in the vector of possible outcomes that was outlined in Chapter 2.
Thus, commercialization through patent licensing in Germany and the
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United Kingdom often replaced other established knowledge transfer
channels. The policy challenge in these economies is to ensure all chan-
nels of knowledge transfer are appropriately nurtured. In middle-income
economies, where patterns of interaction with industry are still develop-
ing, policy convergence needs a different set of complementary measures
to succeed, which include incentives to researchers, changing the legal
structure of university incomes to allow academics to earn income from
consultancy and the use of public research institutes. These measures
compensate for structural differences/deficiencies in national innovation
systems. Identifying the appropriate complementary measures is there-
fore crucial for the success of knowledge transfer policy in both high- and
middle-income economies.
As the international convergence of policies in support of university
patenting and licensing through the allocation of intellectual property (IP)
rights to universities was strongly inspired by US policy, we first revisit the
case of the United States of America (U.S.)We then use the six case studies
in this book to describe the process of convergence of knowledge transfer
policies and the reasons for the substantial differences between the paths
followed by the high- and middle-income countries. We highlight the
different innovation systems in which these interventions were imple-
mented, the different shapes that these interventions took, and why con-
vergence in policy outcomes and in the overall knowledge transfer systems
of these countries has not yet been reached. Finally, we conclude with
implications for policy and further research.
11.2 New Policies in Support of Knowledge Transfer from Public
Science
11.2.1 The U.S. as a Model for Policy
One of the most visible policy interventions in support of knowledge
transfer to industry was the US Federal Government’s implementation of
the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 (Mowery and Sampat 2005). As noted in
Chapter 1, although this piece of legislation was not the first attempt by
governments to regulate university IP – Israel had introduced university
IP policies in the 1960s and the US government had already experi-
mented with giving seventy universities the right to patent federal gov-
ernment-funded inventions since 1968 – the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was
the most influential. The Act granted universities ownership of the IP
emerging from their staff’s federally funded research, which previously
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used to lie with the US Federal Government. The rationale for this move
was to improve the commercialization of research findings bymoving the
ownership of the IP closer to the researchers and institutions involved
and away from distant government offices. Sampat (2009) notes that the
most commonly cited justification by proponents of Bayh-Dole-type
legislation worldwide is that very few government-owned inventions
were commercialized in the U.S. before 1981. For example, in a letter to
the prime minister, arguing for an Indian Bayh-Dole act, the National
Knowledge Commission noted:
In the United States, before the Bayh-Dole Act was enacted, the country’s
federal agencies owned about 28,000 patents, out of which only 5% were
licensed to industry to develop commercial products (Pitroda 2007, as
cited in Sampat 2009)
Policymakers were also concerned that unpatented university discoveries
at an early stage of development would not be taken up by industry unless
a patent provided firms with an incentive to invest in additional research
for their commercialization (Berman 2008; Kenney and Patton 2009).
Hence, Bayh-Dole was designed to encourage commercialization, par-
ticularly through permitting exclusive licensing and preferential access to
public science for SMEs (Schacht 2005). However, the requirement to
give preference to small businesses does not seem to have hadmuch of an
effect and may have been revised at a later date.
The years following the implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act saw the
emergence of several blockbuster patents bringing very high economic
returns to the institutions that owned them. One of these was the Cohen-
Boyer patent (1980–97) for recombinant DNA, which during its seven-
teen-year term earned Stanford University USD 254 million (90 percent
of which came from royalties on product sales), was licensed to 468
companies and used in 2,400 products (Feldman et al. 2005). Another
example was the Axel patent for rDNA inmammalian cells, which earned
Columbia University and its inventors USD 790 million (Colaianni and
Cook Degan 2009). Yet another was the exclusive license for the drug
Taxol given by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Florida State
University to Bristol-Myers-Squibb (BMS). Florida State University
earnedmore than USD 200million in royalties from BMS (Powers 2006).
It is very likely that these very high-profile examples, combined with
the general perception of the US national innovation system as being
particularly successful in the development of advanced technology,
inspired policymakers in other countries to implement similar policies.
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Graff (2007) notes that several countries, including India, Brazil, South
Africa, Malaysia, and Jordan, debated or passed legislation modeled on
the US Bayh-Dole Act.
The success of the Bayh-Dole legislation in the U.S. masks the fact that
Bayh-Dole did not happen in isolation but was nested in a broader policy
mix that aimed to transfer knowledge from the science base to industry.
Block (2008) argues that the U.S. has been engaged since the 1970s in the
creation of a “developmental network state” whose aim is to facilitate the
translation of fundamental research into cutting-edge technologies. It has
done so through the deployment of a broad range of interventions
supporting the transfer of knowledge between university and industry,
both on the “supply side” and also, very importantly, on the “demand
side” (see also Bozeman 1994). Supply-side policies encouraged federal
laboratories to engage with state and local government, universities,
and private industry (Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act,
1980; Federal Technology Transfer Act, 1988). These policies also
supported the formation of university research centers focused on
translational research (Engineering Research Centers, 1985) as well as
centers diffusing technologies developed by the Department of Defense
to small firms (Defense Industrial and Technology Base Initiative,
1991). Complementary demand-side policies, by contrast, provided
matching grants to firms investing in the commercialization of new
technologies (Advanced Technology Program, 1988), earmarked
a share of the budget of federal laboratories to support the research
efforts of small firms (Small Business Innovation Development Act,
1982), encouraged collaborations between small firms and universities
(Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act, 1982),
and incentivized firms’ adoption of advanced technologies
(Manufacturing Extension Program, 1988). Nevertheless, these add-
itional interventions have not figured prominently in the mainstream
policy discourse (Block 2008).
Equally important to note is the lack of any consensus on what created
successful knowledge transfer in areas such as Silicon Valley. Along with
the importance of particular universities, attention has also focused on
other aspects of the innovation system, namely, the presence of superstar
scientists who drew firms into their regions (Zucker et al. 1998), the
presence of knowledge networks and conducive regional systems of
innovation (Storper and Walker 1983; Saxenian 1994), and the role of
diasporic labor and their transnational links (Saxenian 2007) that allowed
nascent small-scale technological experiments in multiple locations and
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the smooth scale-up of successful innovations without running into labor
and material shortages. These factors lurk in the background of the
explanations of US Bayh-Dole successes, but are notable by their absence
in other parts of the world.
11.2.2 Convergence of Knowledge Transfer Policies
Bayh-Dole-inspired legislation has been progressively implemented around
the world since the early 1990s and particularly during the 2000s. In
continental Europe –where therewas a diversity of ownership arrangements
for public sector science –most countries switched to university ownership
between the mid-1990s and 2010 (Geuna and Rossi 2011). Early adopters of
the university ownership system, such as Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
France, and Spain, began to enforce it stringently from the 1990s. In other
countries – Germany, Austria, and most of Scandinavia – the switch in
university ownership was from a previous system of “professor’s privilege,”
where academics owned the IP rights to their inventions and were able to
dispose of them freely. Cambridge University, which had maintained
a professor’s privilege system, finally switched to university ownership in
2005. Currently, in Europe, only a few cases of inventor ownership systems
remain – Sweden being the clearest example. Italy has a system combining
aspects of both. Countries in the former Eastern bloc –Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland – also switched to university ownership
from a previous system of government ownership. The Republic of Korea,
having broken into the group of high-income countries in the 1990s, has
implemented Bayh-Dole-type policies since 2000.
Despite the overarching convergence to Bayh-Dole, university ownership
systems have been implemented in different ways. For example, there are
differences in the vesting of IP rights in the university: in some countries, the
university is the first owner of the IP, while, in others, the IP is owned by the
inventor, and the university has the right to claim it if it is not used within
a certain period, or vice versa, the university has a time limit within which it
has the right to claim ownership of IP, after which it reverts to the inventor.
The scope of the policy also differs: in some countries, all inventions
produced by academics fall under university ownership, while, in others,
there are distinctions depending on whether the invention was developed in
the course of their normal employment or outside it (see DLA Piper 2007,
for a detailed analysis of the different systems).
The three middle-income countries considered in this book also fol-
lowed the pattern of convergence to Bayh-Dole popular in Europe.
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However, as shown in Table 11.1, policy changes were implemented
beyond the vesting of IP ownership rights in the university. Laws were
passed to allow universities to license IP and to profit from it by allowing
them to receive incomes from royalties. Universities were also obliged to
compensate the inventor with a share of royalties. Brazil, China, and
South Africa, which had previously limited the extent to which univer-
sities and public research institutes were permitted to engage with indus-
try, began to relax these rules to allow universities much greater freedom
of action. Laws were also passed so that public universities were given
greater freedom to contract with industry, to establish spinoffs, and to
allow academics to take leave of absence in order to engage in commer-
cialization activities in their own or another firm.
More detail on the regulations that underpinned these changes in other
middle-income countries is presented in WIPO (2011: Chapter 4) and in
Zuniga (2011). This shows that the Bayh-Dole-inspired legislative reforms
implemented in each country were usually a distinct package (e.g., in
terms of the specific rules on the scope of university patenting, invention
disclosure, incentives for researchers, and whether certain safeguards
were instituted to counteract the potentially negative effects of patenting).
Therefore, as argued in Chapter 1, what we term convergence to Bayh-
Dole was never a process of countries making simple binary choices with
respect to institutional or individual patent ownership, but one with
significant differences in the features of the whole package of policies.
Yet, in all cases, this new policy framework was justified by a “lack of
commercialization of public research” argument: the idea that national
universities in all countries produced good-quality research, which
stayed locked up in ivory towers and which they failed to commercialize
sufficiently. In other words, the problem was framed as one of lack of
interaction between university and industry, which needed to be cor-
rected by implementing changes in legal ownership rights and in incen-
tives to encourage interaction between the actors in the system. As
Arundel points out in Chapter 10, an absence of interactions between
university and industry could also be caused by the failure of industry to
“demand” knowledge from universities.
11.3 Different Innovation Systems and Different Policy Mixes
Chapter 2 detailed six different types of knowledge transfer channel from
the public science base to industry. These ranged through research
publications; conferences seminars and meetings with industry;
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education and training of students/researchers recruited by the private
sector; consultancies and contract innovation research (including uni-
versity–industry joint research projects, joint research centers, and PhD
projects); creation of IP for licensing; and creation of spinoff companies.
A striking feature of knowledge transfer from the science base in middle-
income countries lies in the fact that the last two forms of knowledge
transfer are negligible and occur very rarely. This is clear from the
country studies. One could, of course, argue that IP licensing and spinoff
companies account for very small shares of overall university incomes
even in high-income economies (see, for example, Chapter 4 and the
evidence in WIPO 2011). This suggests in turn that the proportion of
formal to informal knowledge transfer may not be the main indicator
that sets high- and middle-income countries apart.
It is, of course, apparent that the institutional frameworks within the
six country case studies (where Bayh-Dole-type measures were imple-
mented) were very different. Further, none of these contexts (and set of
packages) was similar to that of the U.S., the model that they appeared to
be inspired by and aspired to. Some of the key differences between the six
countries’ innovation systems are summarized in Table 11.2, based on
the country chapters and data in Chapter 1. The first key difference is that
firms’ R&D engagement is higher in high-income countries than in
middle-income countries, as noted in Chapter 10. Interactions between
public research and industry, and universities’ research intensity, are also
higher in high-income countries than in middle-income countries. The
importance of public research institutes versus universities is variable.
The Republic of Korea is a fascinating case as it presents some features
that are intermediate between the two groups. Here, collaborative R&D
between public research institutes and private firms has been the most
important and effective form of breaking into the higher-end segment of
the industry (Lee et al. 2005; Lee 2013), whereas interactions between
universities and industry have been low, although this has been changing
since the 1990s.
The detailed case studies in this book, situated in a historical perspec-
tive, help us to appreciate the often overlooked point that what sets high-
and middle-income countries apart are that their innovation systems,
and, more particularly, the system of production and transfer of know-
ledge between university and industry are quite different. In well-
functioning high-income economies there are two-way flows of ideas
and people between the university and industrial sectors. In middle-
income economies, there is a healthy flow of people between universities
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and industry, but channels to establish a flow of ideas are very under-
developed, and public research institutes are prominent as they bridge
the gap between frontier science and its application to domestic indus-
trial conditions. Thus, the success of Bayh-Dole-type policies in these
economies needs to be judged not only by the vector of knowledge
transfer outputs but also by the impetus that the legislation provided
for establishing channels through which new ideas, emerging in univer-
sities, could find direct application in the industrial sector, without
necessarily involving public research institutes in an intermediate role.
The stress in this chapter on links for people and ideas is thus comple-
mentary to the discussion of formal and informal channels of knowledge
exchange outlined in Chapter 2. Formal methods of knowledge transfer
and commercialization identified in that chapter are likely to require the
institution of legal arrangements that favor the movement of ideas, while
Table 11.2 Differences between the national systems of innovation of six
















UK High High Low High
Germany High High Medium High
Republic of
Korea
High High High Medium
China Low Low High Low
Brazil Low Low Medium Low
South Africa Low Low High Low
Source: Authors
Note: The table builds on information provided in Chapter 1 and in the six country
studies presented in this book and refers to the period considered in them. In most
cases, firms’ R&D engagement is measured in terms of R&D expenditure or R&D
and patenting intensity of domestic firms. Interactions between public research
and industry are measured in terms of firms’ licensing of university patents and
business funding of university research. Publications per academic are the most
commonly used indicator of a university’s research intensity.
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the movement of people is likely to favor more informal methods of
knowledge exchange.
11.3.1 High-Income Countries
As noted in Chapter 1, high-income countries are characterized by high
private expenditure in R&D, with numerous large firms that employ
R&D staff and possess a high absorptive capacity for new technological
knowledge and thus are able to interact with universities. In these
countries, the university system is also highly developed, with many
research-intensive universities. Although public research institutes are
more (e.g., Germany, Republic of Korea) or less (e.g., United Kingdom)
present in the system, in all cases, they are not the only source of research
in the country: universities also play a prominent role. The Republic of
Korea is slightly different from Germany, as public research institutes,
although highly research-intensive, deal exclusively with large domestic
firms and have struggled to establish links with smaller companies.
When the knowledge ecosystem is well developed we see two-way links
between public research institutes, universities, and firms, as shown in
Figure 11.1. The first link is through the movement of people, shown by
the solid lines. Students maymove to placements in firms and continue to
collaborate with their former professors. Equally, managers of firms may
draw on expertise in their alma mater to solve technical problems in the
firms they are employed in. Similarly, public research institutes may
invite secondments, allow the use of their R&D labs, and develop joint
R&D projects. These people links, based on both institutionalized and
interpersonal links, are distinct from arms’ length transactions in tech-
nology and ideas through formal knowledge transfer.
The formal links, shown by the dashed lines in Figure 11.1, are likely to
be based on the issue of patents, technology contracts, or equity invest-
ments. Patents are likely to be preferred in the case of mature, codifiable
technologies, where licensing is a viable option because buyers can
understand the technology quite readily (although evidence suggests
that very often scientists who develop patented inventions continue to
collaborate with licensing firms through consulting contracts, in order to
support the implementation of the licensed technology; Thursby et al.
2001). Equity investment in spinoffs may make sense in the context of
early-stage technologies, which cannot be easily codified and may need
joint development with firms.
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In high-income economies, due to the presence of R&D-intensive
domestic firms and multinational corporations (MNCs) and of research-
intensive universities and public research institutes (see also Chapter 10),
both people and ideas circulate relatively frequently, through both insti-
tutionalized channels and well-established interpersonal relations.
Indeed, for these countries, the assumption that a lack of interactions
required new institutions was probably misleading. Certainly in
Germany (see Chapter 5), there was not a lot of university patenting,
and universities were not generating income from IP licensing, but a lot
of knowledge transfer was happening without requiring university
patents. Professors often collaborated directly with industry, either infor-
mally or through research contracts, and ceded their IP rights to their
collaborating firms, which then patented the resulting inventions. Hence,
although German universities owned few patents, professors often fig-
ured as inventors of industrially owned patents, a pattern that was
present in most of continental Europe (Lissoni et al. 2008; Geuna and
Rossi 2011).
The United Kingdom was an intermediate case, since it never had the
professor’s privilege and the IP rights to academic inventions belonged to
the university, which initially ceded them to a central agency tasked with
research commercialization, the British Technology Group. In spite of
some successes (e.g., successful commercialization of the technology
behind hovercrafts and magnetic resonance imaging), this approach
did not lead to a large amount of commercialization: outside the medical
sector, academics’ interactions with industry were mostly either informal
PRIs
State of the art labs
well funded by government
applied research focus
Universities
Human capital training and
placement
basic and applied research focus
Established firms
High absorptive capacity




Figure 11.1 The knowledge ecosystem in high-income economies
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or focused on research contracting. Cambridge, which maintained
a system of professor’s privilege until 2005, saw intense involvement of
professors in the development of spinoff companies, some of which
spawned very large firms, particularly in ICT, which eventually generated
a local high-technology cluster (Athreye 2004).
In the Republic of Korea, large firms were strong investors in R&D and
had a very strong relationship with the government (chaebol system).
Public research institutes played a greater role than universities in public
R&D and knowledge transfer in the process of catch-up.
In these countries, characterized by preexisting strong interactions
between universities, public research institutes, and firms, the introduction
of Bayh-Dole-type legislation could disrupt as well as enhance interactions.
In German-speaking and Scandinavian countries, as well as in Cambridge
pre-2005, patents were owned by inventors, so the introduction of Bayh-
Dole-type legislation brought the patenting process further away from
inventors; exactly the opposite of what had happened in the U.S., where
patents were already owned by the Federal Government so the change
brought the patenting process closer to inventors (Mowery and Sampat
2005). As a result, this process could disrupt existing relationships – which
had developed in harmony with a system where inventors held IP rights –
rather than enhance them. Indeed, Chapter 5 argues that this is what
happened in Germany, where, up to 2008, the change in policy reduced
the number of patents by university academics by 17 percent and had no
effect on the number of startups.
In the United Kingdom, which already had a system of university owner-
ship for many universities, universities’ obligation to commercialize their
patents through the British Technology Group was removed in 1985. Since
then, most universities have set up internal knowledge transfer offices
(KTOs) dealing with commercialization activities. Given that in the
United Kingdom individual academics could not dispose of their IP freely,
most collaborations with industry already occurred with some involvement
of the university institution, and there is little evidence of displacement
effects. However, there is evidence that the increase in university patenting
did not lead to the expected increase in licensing income, with licensing
income concentrated in a few universities (see Chapter 4).1 There are signs
of a decline in university patenting in recent years as universities are
becoming more selective in which patents they pursue (Tang et al. 2010).
1 Cross-country evidence in WIPO (2011) shows that in many countries only a handful of
universities accounted for the bulk of the commercialization activities.
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11.3.2 Middle-Income Countries
In contrast to high-income countries, middle-income countries are char-
acterized by a low number of R&D-intensive firms, with the majority of
domestic companies performing very little research and possessing low
absorptive capacity, as discussed in Chapter 1. The few companies that
perform R&D tend to be MNCs, or companies that are partly govern-
ment owned (e.g., the Brazil country study noted that 80 percent of
patents generated in the country have nonresident applicants). These
countries also tend to have a strong division of labor in knowledge
production, with universities concentrating on basic research and the
training of students, while public research institutes are tasked with
adapting frontier research to the needs of industry and government.
The data in Chapter 1 also show that in middle-income countries most
research is performed in public research institutes funded by and
responding to the government.
Figure 11.2 sketches the knowledge ecosystem in middle-income
countries. The people links work well, and there are institutionalized
links between public research institutes and firms. However, public
research institutes tend to be strongly specialized by sector (very often,
agriculture, engineering, and health), therefore interactions with firms
are concentrated in particular industries and involve large firms.
Furthermore, as the country studies of China, Brazil, and South Africa
note, the links between public research institutes and industry are still
limited outside of particular sectors or technology areas. One reason for
this limitationmay be the small size of many public research laboratories,
which, with a few exceptions, do not produce world-leading research.
This limited interaction may also be due to contractual laws that limit the
employment of university researchers by other employers: for example,
public research institutes in Brazil have only been allowed to sign know-
ledge transfer contracts with companies since 2004. The cultural chasm
between scientists working in labs and industry staff may also be a factor.
In many countries, pursuit of science and learning may be seen as
a “pure” goal and one that should not be contaminated by commercial
considerations.2
Our case studies suggest that in middle-income countries, the main
difference when compared to Figure 11.1 for high-income countries is
2 In India, for example, Saraswati (the goddess of learning) is said to leave the room when
Lakshmi (the goddess of wealth) enters it. See https://devdutt.com/articles/battle-of-
lakshmi-and-sarawati.html.
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the presence of only weak linkages (and sometimes their complete
absence) for transferring research ideas, knowledge, and technology
from the university science base to industry. Universities in middle-
income countries mainly engage in training and provide the human
capital for both industry and public research institutes. These training
links have resulted in informal people-mediated channels of knowledge
transfer, but formal channels are largely limited – where present, they
usually take the form of contract research and consulting. Interestingly,
the Republic of Korea shows these features as well, despite being a high-
income country.
The absence of linkages between university and industry poses two
challenges for the implementation of knowledge transfer policies. As
already noted in Chapter 10, universities have not yet developed a way
to bridge the gap between the basic scientific research they produce and
the prototype level of development of an innovative idea. Many firms
require the latter to readily absorb and use to scale up production.
The second challenge comes from the legal and contractual obligations
surrounding university researchers, which are often not conducive to
engagement with industry on research issues. Our case studies provide
evidence of the full range of such challenges.
In all the middle-income countries studied in this book, the imple-
mentation of Bayh-Dole-inspired knowledge transfer policies encoun-
tered problems created by the missing (ideas) links between universities
and industry and further rounds of policy changes were required to
overcome the problems. Thus each of our country chapters also outlines
a policy-induced process of adaptation of institutional frameworks that
PRIs: 
State of the art labs
well funded by government
applied research focus
Universities:









Figure 11.2 The public research ecosystem in middle-income economies
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share some important similarities, but that also differ in several details.
While the general policy discourse around the implementation of Bayh-
Dole-type legislation seemed to suggest that these changes in formal rules
would, in themselves, be sufficient to achieve the hoped-for increases in
commercialization activities, in practice, most countries have also imple-
mented a range of supporting measures aimed at stimulating the creation
of the infrastructures and competences that are required to connect
university actors to industry. This includes rules to support exploiting
the new IP rights framework, as well as measures to stimulate firms’
demand for university IP (e.g., funds for joint research projects).
11.3.3 Policy Mixes Adopted
Analysis of the policy interventions enacted in the six country case
studies can be subsumed under two major categories and related subcat-
egories. The first category of complementary interventions aims to intro-
duce supply-side incentives for universities to supply technology more
readily and frequently to industry. These include institutional-level
incentives for universities to patent and license IP and to interact with
industry in different ways, for example, by establishing KTOs and other
intermediaries encouraging interactions between universities and indus-
try. These intermediaries manage research contracts, the creation of
spinoffs, the establishment of joint research centers, and other related
activities. In some cases, KTOs were established at local, regional or
national levels, with or without the involvement of universities, and
several universities “shared” KTO services.
As technology transactions are plagued by asymmetric information
about the nature of technology and potential applications, individual
researchers are in the best position to alleviate these concerns. In add-
ition, the interpersonal networks of researchers can often be used to kick-
start links with industry when none exists. Therefore, in all cases, supply-
side measures also included incentives for individual academics to
engage in knowledge transfer. Examples include monetary incentives
that allow academics to receive income from royalties and consulting
activities in addition to their salaries; career development incentives that
include knowledge transfer performance as a criterion for academic
promotion; incentives for academics to engage in entrepreneurial and
other business activities, including permissions to take leave of absence in
order to work for university spinoffs or for other companies, and to earn
income from these activities.
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The second category of interventions consists of demand-side incen-
tives for firms to engage with industry. These incentives range from
general incentives for firms to invest in R&D (such as R&D tax credits,
grants, innovation vouchers) and more specific incentives for firms to
collaborate with universities and public research institutes (such as joint
project grants, subsidies for the establishment of joint research centers,
and mandatory investment in university research). All these incentives
can be created purely through legal requirements, or they can involve the
use of government funds, either in the form of government subsidies for
certain activities or in the form of rewards for universities’ good perform-
ance in certain activities.
Table 11.3 summarizes the extent to which the six countries imple-
mented supply-side and demand-side incentives of the kinds just
described. As can be seen, most countries implemented a combination
of incentives. All of them focused on supply-side incentives, consistent
with the argument that they saw the problem primarily as one of getting
universities to reach out to industry.
Middle-income countries have mainly issued legal requirements for
universities to engage with industry (although individual universities can
enact their own internal policies providing academics with monetary
incentives, for example, to develop spinoff companies or engage in
consulting activities), while high-income countries have also dedicated
government funds to supporting universities in these activities. All coun-
tries have invested public funds in the setup of KTOs (either within
universities, or at local, regional, or national levels). In Brazil, while
every public university and public research institute in the country is
required to have a KTO, the Innovation Act allowed institutions to share
a KTO, so that several of them serve more than one research institution.
On the demand side, all countries enacted specificmonetary incentives
for companies to interact with public research, mainly in the form of
R&D tax breaks and opportunities to bid for joint R&D projects. In
Brazil, companies in some sectors such as energy are required to invest
a share of their revenue in R&D in partnership with universities and
public research institutes. This has been successful in stimulating univer-
sity–industry interactions. However, this requirement applies to com-
panies that are large, often multinationals headquartered outside Brazil,
and benefits only a few research-intensive universities and public
research institutes. The majority of public research institutes in Brazil
continue to be too small and insufficiently research-intensive to benefit
from these incentives.
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In addition, the case studies provide interesting insights into the
timing and sequence of the policy changes. Almost all countries started
by implementing legal changes but had to follow them up with a mixture
of carrot (monetary incentives) and stick (performance evaluation) pol-
icies, to encourage take-up of these activities.
In Brazil, policy interventions implemented in 1996 allowed univer-
sities to own and license IP as well as compensating individual inventors.
In 2004, the policy changed to allow universities to retain some income
from licensing and to contract with industry. Universities and public
research institutes were also required to have a KTO or use the services of
a shared KTO, and were provided with some funding for this.3
Despite some increases in university patenting and licensing activities
in Brazil, these supply-side incentives have had limited effectiveness in
stimulating universities’ interactions with industry, due to several prob-
lems, including lack of clarity, insufficient financial incentives for indi-
vidual researchers, and limited resources and competences of KTOs,
whose staff consist entirely of public servants. KTOs suffer from high
staff turnover and a dearth of qualified or specialized staff, because their
link to government institutions obliges them to rely on public tenders in
hiring new staff and they do not offer competitive salaries. According to
the MCTIC (2017), more than 50 percent of KTO staff had no previous
experience in the private sector.
China started in 2002 by enacting laws that allowed university owner-
ship of IP and compensation of inventors for their IP.More than a decade
later (2015–16), it enacted a raft of measures allowing universities to
profit from their IP (retain royalties, set up spinoff firms), and permitting
academics to work for companies by taking leave of absence. One way of
interpreting this lag is that the early experiments with researchers initi-
ating links were ready to be institutionalized only a decade later.
A remarkable feature of the Chinese case is the combination of monetary
incentives and performance monitoring to achieve the objective of
knowledge exchange. In this respect, the country’s overall policy is
similar to the case of the United Kingdom.
South Africa is the most recent country in our sample to have enacted
knowledge transfer policies, and, in contrast to the other countries, they
immediately allowed both individuals and universities to retain profits
3 There were a few open calls to grant fellowships for hiring people to work in KTOs in
Brazilian universities in recent years. In 2006, there was a funding program from CNPq
and FINEP to support the creation and implementation of KTOs.
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from their IP. In South Africa, the Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research (CSIR) dominates the public research institute landscape and
has highly specialized labs in the area of petrochemicals. CSIR also has
extensive links with universities. The government has not provided direct
funding to support universities’ engagement with industry, but it has
enacted some demand-side measures in the form of monetary incentives,
which include the provision of funding for companies’ R&D, often in
partnership with universities or public research institutes.
In the Republic of Korea, the government’s promotion efforts were
focused on encouraging interactions between domestic public research
institutes and universities and firms, particularly SMEs, whose role in the
economy the government intended to strengthen. They did so through
incentives for commercialization but particularly through strengthening
the KTO system through numerous measures. So far, efforts have not
been as successful as was hoped (see Chapter 6). Large firms do interact
with universities by establishing R&D centers on the campuses of major
universities,4 although they have tended to invite and hire star professors
(mostly Korean) from universities located abroad. SMEs lack absorptive
capacity and consequently need technologies to be provided at a higher
level of technological readiness. This has been stymied by a research
funding model that provides funds on a project basis, with funding
often terminated before a discovery is developed sufficiently.
11.4 An Ideal Policy Mix?
If one form of legislation cannot fit all circumstances, how should
policymakers decide which polices to adopt? Clearly the objectives of
policies to support knowledge transfer from universities will be different
in high- and middle-income countries and may even differ among
universities within the country.
In high-income countries, the main challenge facing knowledge transfer
policies is the need to avoid displacement. As patent-mediated commer-
cialization processes can produce very high financial rewards, it may be
important to ensure that financial constraints do not push universities to
prefer any one kind of commercialization. Thus, first, funding to univer-
sities should be increased so that different channels of commercialization
are not substituted for one another. Second, universities should try to
4 For instance, Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Motors have R&D centers on the campus
of Seoul National University.
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promote a broad range of interactions outside formal channels, such as
through the involvement of alumni active in research − often in other
countries. In recent years, the United Kingdom has sought to redress the
imbalance in perceptions of value by inclusion of research impact as an
important evaluation criterion on a par with patents and publications in
research-active universities. Last, the policy focus on rewarding IP owner-
ship should subtly shift to encourage and reward IP use by universities or
firms rather than ownership per se. This could take the form of recognizing
impact (as in United Kingdom universities) or take the form of a subsidy
that could be used by the department or inventor as income for further
research.
In middle-income countries, interactions between university and
industry face greater challenges and may need more policy intervention.
In these countries, the knowledge ecosystem is relatively immature and
research interactions between universities and industries are generally
lacking (except for a few interactions involving large, multinational firms
and a few highly research-intensive universities and public research
institutes) due to weaknesses on both sides.
A first problem confronting middle-income country governments is
the overall limited research intensity of their universities due to
a traditional focus on teaching. Several additional factors reinforce this
low research intensity. Universities have traditional incentive structures
that reward teaching over commercialization and industry engagement.
Additionally, universities find it difficult to retain their brightest and
their best. Policies to correct these problems include allowing the univer-
sity and inventor to profit from knowledge transfer and research, in part,
by ensuring that extra profits are not taxed away as higher income – that
is, ensuring that there is a financial incentive to use scientific knowledge
and plow back the investments from it.
A second problem confronting policymakers in middle-income coun-
tries is the small volume of (or nonexistent) industry interactions. When
such interactions are nonexistent because the contractual obligations of
university researchers do not allow self-employment or employment by
others (e.g., through research contracts), then legal changes may be
needed to permit such interactions to take place. If there are no legal
barriers, then establishing contacts may require the active involvement of
the researcher and direction by knowledge transfer specialists with
knowledge of industry needs and an understanding of university
researcher contexts. In high-income economies such roles are usually
played by KTOs, which is warranted when there is a large volume of
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technology transactions. In middle-income economies, the small volume
of transactions may not warrant a specialist centralized intermediary to
aid and advise the university. In the short term, universities may also gain
by interacting more closely with public research institutes, which were
historically set up to translate frontier technology into applicable tech-
nology for local industries. There is some evidence that South African
and Indian CSIR laboratories are doing this for particular sectors, and
utilizing existing public research institutes may offer a more resource-
efficient method of knowledge exchange than establishing new KTOs.
The third problem facing middle-income countries is the lack of
a culture of interaction with industry and lack of awareness of commer-
cialization possibilities. KTO staff are usually career civil servants, gov-
erned by civil service rules and promotion policies. Staffing KTOs with
scientists familiar with industrial R&D is extremely important to chan-
ging the culture of interaction between university and industry. Policies
that target the recruitment into management positions of scientists who
had some training abroad could also help to change the research culture
in universities. This has been done extremely successfully in China and
Singapore.
Chapter 10 has offered a number of suggestions for improving firms’
uptake of technology produced in universities and we will not repeat
them here except to note that offering joint funds for exploitation with
university partners may both alleviate the low research intensity of
existing firms and encourage them to search for the best university
partners and so make it mutually beneficial for universities and firms to
establish links around research and the commercialization of research.
We summarize our arguments in Figure 11.3, which outlines five
questions that governments and universities must ask themselves before
deciding on the appropriate policy mix.
11.5 Summary
Our concern in this chapter has been to look more closely at the policy-
induced convergence of the knowledge ecosystem that the Bayh-Dole-
type legislation in various countries attempted, drawing on the extensive
material of the country case studies. Our analysis suggests that in high-
income countries, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, where the
knowledge ecosystems were already well developed and mature, the
adoption of Bayh-Dole-type legislation while simultaneously cutting
back on government funding of research in universities and public
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research institutes created the risk of “displacement effects.” By displace-
ment effects, we mean research expected to produce patents being incen-
tivized and preferred (due to its higher expected value) over other types
of commercialization, such as more informal and risky codeveloped
research (in spinoff firms or with domestic firms). Despite this, the data
show that non-IP methods such as contract research are a much bigger
income earner, even in the United Kingdom, than research-producing
patents for licensing, while overall income from knowledge transfer has
remained steady as a proportion of university incomes. This could be
because patent use was harder to achieve than patent ownership and/or
in many research fields, contract research, or the development of appli-
cations in spinoff firms were simply better avenues of commercialization.
In middle-income economies, where knowledge ecosystems were less
mature, with missing links in the knowledge ecosystem, the Bayh-Dole
legislation kick-started a process of institutional reform. Middle-income
Is the frequency of contact
high?
Set up a university KTO and ensure
appointed staff of the KTO have
industrial experience
Use dedicated funds to encourage
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Figure 11.3 Five questions to guide policy toward knowledge exchange from
universities
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countries often needed to adopt a complementary set of policies (in
stages) in addition to permitting university ownership of IP. In most
countries in our study, the requirement that universities undertake
research that benefits industry was supported by a generous allocation
of financial resources to enable such a transformation. The role that
policy played in plugging institutional gaps is interesting (although it
differs from country to country) and may, in time, deliver the desired
outcome of an increase in the value of university research for the innov-
ation activities of national firms.
The chapter concludes by noting that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all
policy and enumerates a number of university-level factors that should be
taken account of in middle- and low-income economies in order to
deliver an effective knowledge transfer policy.
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